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Abstract 
This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the 
inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye 
also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal 
was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has 
entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. 
Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability 
elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In 
the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of 
participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the 
ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally 
perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its 
tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB 
amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated 
intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market 
intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained. 
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1. The single monetary policy and the ESCB 
The Treaty of Maastricht instituted the euro as the currency of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (Article 3.4 Treaty on European Union), the single monetary policy for participating 
countries (the eurozone) and the eurozone monetary authority – comprising the National 
Central Banks (NCBs) of the European Union and, at its centre, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), together constituting the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The Eurosystem 
is made up of the ECB and the (currently 19) NCBs whose currency is the euro. The ECB 
coordinates operations and the NCBs execute the transactions, such as providing funds to 
banks, settling cross-border transactions and managing foreign exchange reserves. The ECB 
must be consulted, and may submit opinions, on any matter in its field of competence 
(Article 127.4 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU). 
Article 127.2 TFEU further specifies the tasks of the ESCB, that is: to define and implement 
the monetary policy of the Union, conduct foreign exchange operations, hold and manage 
the foreign exchange reserves of the member states, and promote the smooth operation of the 
payment system. Furthermore, Article 127.6 TFEU allows the Council, acting by regulation, 
after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB, to confer upon the ECB specific tasks 
for the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions 
(excluding insurance companies). This provision has been used to establish the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),1 composed of the ECB and the national supervisory 
authorities. The system is open to countries not participating in the euro, which may join by 
signing a special agreement with the ECB.  
The construction was based on two strong premises. First, the single monetary policy by 
means of the common currency should be freed of any political interference – by the member 
states and the European institutions – and specifically of any connection to budgetary 
policies, thus eliminating all risks of monetisation of public sector deficits. Second, its 
primary goal would be “to maintain price stability” (Article 127.1 TFEU). Other policy goals 
typically associated with central banks, such as supporting employment and growth and 
preserving financial stability, would only come into play once the primary goal was secured.  
                                                     
*
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opinions or possible errors in this paper. 
1
 Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. 
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These premises stemmed from a widespread consensus, which had been building up over 
the previous decades among economists and policy-makers, whereby monetary policy could 
be seen as a ‘technical’ function of high complexity but ‘neutral’ for the real economy, once 
the risk of inflation was credibly eradicated from the economy by taking the money-printing 
press away from elected politicians (James, 2012). 
Accordingly, the Treaty of Maastricht entrusted monetary policy to a separate entity 
possessing the required independence and technical expertise; its statute is an integral part 
of the Treaty, to which it is annexed as Protocol n. 4 (as from Article 129.2 TFEU). Since the 
Treaty can only be modified by unanimous consensus of the member states, under this 
institutional set-up central bank independence enjoys waterproof protection, even stronger 
than the Bundesbank under German law. All bonds with national fiscal policies were 
severed once and for all by moving the monetary policy function outside national borders, 
therefore making it utterly unreachable by national politicians. Absolute political 
independence and irreversible separation from national fiscal policy would offer private 
agents the credible institutions required to anchor inflation expectations. 
Independence is further protected by the provision in Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 ESCB 
Statute whereby the ECB, the NCBs and the members of their decision-making bodies must 
not receive or seek instructions from Union institutions or national governments, by the long 
term of office (eight years non-renewable), and by the high personal and professional 
qualifications mandated for the members of the Executive Board.2 National legislatures must 
ensure that NCBs enjoy similar independence, and that their governors are suitable persons 
appointed for at least five years.  
Further safeguards against the risk of monetisation of sovereign debts were in the Treaty 
provisions prohibiting all types of monetary (‘overdraft’) financing of Union or government 
institutions by the ECB (Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 ESCB Statute); the ‘no-bailout’ 
clause (Article 125 TFEU) whereby Union institutions cannot take over the liabilities of any 
member state government and administrative body; and the excessive deficits procedure 
(Article 126 TFEU) for countries exceeding the twin limits on the public sector deficit (3% of 
GDP) and debt (60% of GDP).  
As was mentioned, Article 127.1 TFEU and Article 2 ESCB Statute set price stability as the 
primary objective of monetary policy. They also provide that, without prejudice to this goal, 
the ESCB “shall support the general economic policies in [authors’ emphasis] the Union 
[and] shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition”.3 The definition of the inflation goal and the formulation of the monetary policy 
objectives and instruments of the single monetary policy of the eurozone belong to the 
Governing Council of the ECB, the main decision-making body of the Eurosystem.4  
                                                     
2
 Article 11 of the Statute of the ESCB. The Executive Board of the ECB includes the President, the Vice-
President and four other members, appointed by the European Council acting by qualified majority.  
3
 The preposition “in” was inserted in the text by cautious negotiators before “the Union” to avoid reference to 
a common policy stance “of” the Union – which may eventually come into existence under Articles 119-121 
TFEU and monetary policy might have to ‘support’. Cf. James (2012). 
4
 The Governing Council decides by simple majority (of the votes cast); each member of the Executive Board 
has one vote, and each national governor has one vote but the number of governors with voting rights cannot 
exceed 15. Since the member central banks exceed 15 (they are 19), a system of rotation has been established 
for the exercise of the vote by the governors, as required by Article 10.2 ESCB Statute. 
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Since monetary policy targets are determined with exclusive reference to domestic economic 
conditions, the exchange rate cannot be an explicit policy target, as this would undermine 
the stability-oriented stance of monetary policy.5 The exchange rate of the euro has became a 
residual variable, determined by the relative monetary stance expected to prevail vis-à-vis the 
main currency areas, notably the US dollar area.6 
2. Monetary policy instruments 
The implementation of the ECB monetary policy rests on two pillars (European Central 
Bank, 2011). The first pillar, the monetary policy strategy, determines the interest rate 
appropriate to achieving price stability. This is defined as a rate of inflation which over the 
medium term should remain “below but close to 2 per cent”.7 According to this definition, 
not only inflation above 2%, but also excessively low inflation or outright deflation (which is 
a self-sustaining fall in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)), are incompatible 
with price stability. The target refers to the year-on-year increase in the HICP, an index – 
calculated by Eurostat in liaison with national statistical offices – that has been harmonised 
across the eurozone countries to closely approximate the price of a representative basket of 
consumer expenditure. 
The ECB monetary strategy aims at firmly anchoring inflation expectations, based on a 
“consistent and systematic method for conducting monetary policy”8 with a medium-term 
reference time horizon, and clear and open communication to the public of its goals and the 
underlying analysis. However, while the inflation forecast is central in the policy analysis 
and discussions, both within the ECB governing bodies and public presentations, the ECB 
does not adhere to a formal inflation targeting strategy – entailing quasi-automatic reactions 
to deviations of forecast inflation from the target over a predetermined time horizon. Rather, 
it bases its actions on a more flexible strategy both as regards the economic variables taken 
into consideration and the relevant time horizon for responding to shocks in the economy. 
Thus, in assessing the appropriate response to a price shock or an emerging threat to price 
stability, the sources and the nature of the shock may entail different responses. In this 
context, the ECB has always included financial stability among the factors to be taken into 
consideration, owing to the potential impact of financial imbalances on output and price 
developments. Therefore, while there is no formal targeting of monetary aggregates, a 
                                                     
5
 Under Article 219 TFEU, the Council – acting by unanimity on a recommendation of the ECB or the European 
Commission, in this case after consulting the ECB – may conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate 
system between the euro and other currencies. This, however, should never prejudge the ability of the ESCB to 
ensure price stability, and at all events does not appear as a likely occurrence under present international 
monetary and exchange arrangements.  
6
 An important motivation behind the common currency had been to eliminate once and for all exchange rate 
instability among its participants. In this regard, the breakdown of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 
1993 was seen as conclusive proof that the new environment of high capital mobility and international financial 
integration was incompatible with a regime of stable but adjustable exchange rates, as had been the EMS. 
7
 The ECB Governing Council first announced the quantitative definition of the target for inflation in 1998, 
originally referring only to inflation “below 2 per cent”’; the target was changed to “below but close to 2 per 
cent” by the Governing Council in November 2003. Cf. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ 
mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html.  
8
 ECB (2011), p. 63. 
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monetary pillar in its strategy allows it to ‘lean against the wind’ of building imbalances, 
such as an excessive money and credit creation or asset price increases.9  
The second pillar, the operational framework, is the set of instruments and procedures to 
achieve the desired interest rate. The ESCB Statute (Article 18) provides that, in order to 
carry out the tasks of the ESCB, the ECB and NCBs may: 
(i) buy and sell outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreements and 
lend or borrow any type of marketable instruments (therefore including 
sovereigns) in any currency as well as precious metals; and  
(ii) conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, 
with lending based on adequate collateral. 
The credit institutions of the euro area are also required to maintain minimum reserves on 
their current accounts at the Eurosystem – currently, 1% of deposits and debt securities with 
maturity up to two years – with the twin purpose of stabilising money market interest rates10 
and maintaining a ‘structural’ liquidity scarcity in the banks so as to strengthen the ECB’s 
ability to steer rates with open market operations.  
The Governing Council may also decide, by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, to use 
other operational methods of monetary policy “as it sees fit” (Article 20 ESCB Statute), while 
always respecting its primary goal of price stability. The decisions of the Governing Council 
on monetary policy instruments and procedures are formalised in the Guideline of the ECB, 
which is published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
In the Continental tradition of bank-based financial systems, the Eurosystem operations 
mainly consist of bank refinancing facilities, mostly in the form of reverse transactions 
granted against eligible collateral: up until the financial crisis, they comprised the short-term 
(MROs,11 one week) and the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs, three months), fine 
tuning operations (non-standard duration, also including collection of fixed-term deposits 
and foreign exchange swaps), issuance of ECB debt certificates (to drain liquidity), and 
standing facilities at the disposal of banks to draw or deposit funds overnight to smooth 
liquidity (the marginal lending and deposit facility). Reverse transactions minimise the 
market and credit risks taken by the ECB. Once the financial crisis struck, special instruments 
and facilities were introduced, both for refinancing banks under stress for longer periods and 
for purchasing private and sovereign securities outright, as we shall see. 
                                                     
9
 Under this approach, the ECB does not consider ‘pricking’ asset price bubbles as a viable strategy, but neither 
does it accept the view whereby central banks should stand aside and wait until an asset price bubble runs its 
course and then bursts (‘mopping after’), a strategy which can become a source of moral hazard and encourage 
excessive risk-taking by financial intermediaries and other leveraged investors. Cf. ECB (2011).  
10
 This is achieved by creating an incentive for institutions to smooth temporary liquidity fluctuations, thanks to 
the (daily) averaging provision for the calculation of the reserve requirements over the maintenance period. 
The averaging provision allows credit institutions to smooth out daily fluctuations in their liquidity since 
transitory deficiencies may be compensated by transitory excesses within the same maintenance period. This 
inter-temporal arbitrage possibility tends to equalise the shortest money market rates with their expected level 
at the end of the maintenance period. Maintenance periods are set by the ECB and currently last between six 
and seven weeks. Cf. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140717_1.en.html.  
11
 Main refinancing operations. 
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The MROs are the main monetary policy instrument, and the interest rate charged on these 
operations is the key official reference rate. The rate charged on marginal lending – available 
overnight for unlimited amounts (against adequate collateral) for eligible counterparties on 
their own initiative – and the rate paid on banks’ deposits in the standing deposit facility 
effectively set a ceiling and a floor, respectively, for the overnight money market rate, and 
hence the corridor within which this rate may fluctuate. The reference overnight market 
interest rate is the EONIA, or euro overnight index average of overnight rates in eurozone 
money markets, leaving room for other money market rates to adjust in response. 
Eligible collateral is defined in a single list of assets, covering marketable and non-marketable 
instruments that fulfil uniform euro-wide criteria specified by the ECB (non-marketable 
instruments cannot be used for overnight operations). Eligible counterparties in the 
Eurosystem monetary operations are credit institutions subject to the system’s minimum 
reserve requirements and to supervision ‘of high quality’ by at least one national authority of 
a participating country. 
The panoply of instruments is completed by the lines of Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA) established with the NCBs to assist individual banks facing temporary liquidity 
problems; therefore, these lines are in principle not available to insolvent banks – although 
distinguishing between illiquidity and insolvency may not be easy in the presence of a 
systemic shock to the banking system. Up until the inception of the SSM, the decision to 
intervene was left to the NCBs, except when there was a Troika assistance programme – in 
which case the ECB would also come in to assess the state of the banks. The collateral 
requirements were set by the NCBs, normally with less demanding standards than the 
ECB’s. These lending-of-last-resort functions were functionally related to the NCBs’ 
supervisory responsibilities, and as such not part of the single monetary policy. However, 
the ECB was to be fully and timely informed of their beneficiaries, size and timing; and the 
Governing Council could restrict these operations if it considered that they interfered with 
the monetary policy tasks of the Eurosystem (acting by a two-thirds majority of the votes 
cast).12 
As may be seen, the Eurosystem possesses all the policy tools normally available to a central 
bank, with ample room for manoeuvre on how to deploy them. However, their actual use is 
subject to political constraints, reflecting the goals assigned to the Eurosystem by the Treaty. 
As we shall see, this became a source of serious difficulty when the Eurosystem had to 
confront the need to intervene as lender of last resort in the government bonds markets.   
3. Overview of monetary policy in 2002-12 
In its early years the ECB was fairly reactive to economic and financial developments (Figure 
1). After an initial decrease, between November 1999 and October 2000 its MROs reference 
rate was raised in steps by 225 basis points, to a peak of 4.75%, as inflation increased from 
below 1% (in early 1999) to above 2% (and to over 3% in May 2001), in a world environment 
of accelerating growth and commodity prices. Then, in the early 2000s, large shocks hit the 
world economy, i.e. the dot.com stock market crash and the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
the US, throwing the world economy into recession. The ECB monetary stance became quite 
                                                     
12
 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/201402_elaprocedures.en.pdf?e716d1d560392b101427 
24f50c6bf66a. 
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expansionary till late in the decade. Between early 2001 and June 2003 the ECB lowered its 
reference rate by 275 basis points, bringing it down to 2%, despite a concomitant sharp 
acceleration in its main reference monetary aggregate, M3;13 official rates were then left 
unchanged till the end of 2005, as economic activity was recovering slowly. 
Figure 1. Inflation, MRO rate, money (M3) and credit growth 
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Source: ECB, Monthly data. Credit is defined by the ECB as lending by monetary financial institutions (central 
banks, banks, money market funds, and other intermediaries) to the private sector, adjusted for loan sales and 
securitisation. 
All in all, until the summer of 2006 the monetary conditions were fairly lax: inflation tended 
to exceed the medium-term target of 2% and M3 growth remained on average well above the 
4.5% indicative target announced by the ECB. On the other hand, beginning in April 2002 the 
euro appreciated – recovering to around parity (an exchange rate of one) with the dollar in 
the last quarter of 2002 (Figure 2) – hovering in the $1.20-1.40 range from early 2004 to 
summer 2007, and then rising to close to $1.60 in the ensuing three quarters. Meanwhile, 
GDP growth and wage inflation remained subdued. It would thus appear that the ECB was 
willing to condone ample liquidity, brisk money and credit growth, as long as the price 
stability target did not seem threatened, thanks also to the strong euro; easy money would 
                                                     
13
 This acceleration was initially seen as mainly reflecting an increased liquidity preference by investors, 
achieved by reducing exposure to capital markets by means of asset sales, and not an emerging excess supply 
of money – as seemed confirmed by the concomitant deceleration of credit to the private sector, an aggregate 
closely watched by the ECB. 
% 
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help the economic recovery and avoid adding steam to the euro appreciation. One is 
tempted to conclude that the TFEU provision whereby, once price stability is assured, the 
ESCB “shall support the general economic policies in the Union” (Article 127 TFEU) did not 
fall on deaf ears – which was fully in line with the Deutsche Bundesbank’s tradition. 
Figure 2. Eurozone nominal effective and dollar/euro exchange rates (January 1999=100) 
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Source: Eurostat and ECB, monthly data. 
 
A new round of rate increases was only undertaken around the end of 2005; between 
December of that year and July 2008, the main official reference rate was raised in total by 
225 basis points, bringing it up to 4.25%. While money and credit growth slumped in the first 
half of 2008, the ECB was concerned by the pickup in headline inflation, which briefly 
surpassed 4%, mainly pushed by the increase in international oil and food prices, before 
falling rapidly with economic activity. This turn to increasing restriction – very much in line 
with the Federal Reserve on the other side of the Atlantic – was well under way when the 
Lehman Brothers failure hit the world financial system (September 2008), leading to a new 
turnaround in official rates, which by mid-2009 were brought down to 1%.14 
                                                     
14
 In August 2007 the first sparks of tension to come from the emerging sub-prime crisis in US markets hit 
European financial markets, when French retailing giant BNP-Paribas announced the suspension of three of its 
funds (Parvest Dynamic ABS, ABS Euribor and ABS Eonia). The ECB reacted promptly by – for the first time – 
supplying ample liquidity (some €95 billion overnight in a few operations) on a fixed rate and full allotment 
basis, where demand of eligible counterparties was fully met.  
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An important feature worth stressing in these developments is the different evolution of 
monetary conditions in the core and the periphery of the eurozone. The national 
contributions to aggregate M3 growth in the eurozone, shown in Figure 3, display great 
variation. M3 was growing more rapidly in the periphery than in the core in the early years 
of the Eurosystem, and then fell more steeply after the inception of the financial crisis. In 
Ireland and Spain there was a real credit-driven boom that lasted till summer 2007, and then 
a steep fall lasting through 2012; in Greece buoyant growth of M3 lasted till September 2008, 
the ensuing contraction through summer 2012. In all these cases, the Greek crisis prompted a 
‘double-dip’ recession more or less lasting till mid-2012. In Italy the impact of the initial 
‘Lehman shock’ on M3 was moderate, but then there was a larger double-dip decline in 2011, 
as the country became entangled in the sovereign debt crisis. In Germany, on the other hand, 
the initial shock on M3 growth, while not negligible, was considerably less intense than in 
the periphery, and positive rates of growth returned already in mid-2010. Some deceleration 
is observed during the most acute phase of the sovereign debt crisis, from the second half of 
2011 to the first half of 2012, but even then M3 growth always stayed positive. 
Figure 3. National contributions to M3 (annual growth rates, %) 
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Source: National Central Banks, monthly data. 
In Figure 4 we show aggregated credit growth data for the eurozone and the PIIGS,15 
together with Germany. Credit is important, as the ECB monitors this aggregate very closely, 
                                                     
15
 ‘PIIGS’ are Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
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as an indicator of the underlying forces driving monetary growth. As could be expected, the 
PIIGS curve displays much larger variations than the German curve in 2003-07 (expansion) 
and 2008-09 (contraction), and then a double-dip fall after the explosion of the Greek crisis. 
Figure 4 confirms that in 2003-05 the monetary stance was lax for the PIIGS, but probably 
consistent with the need to tackle the subdued recovery in the German economy, well 
reflected in the weak demand for credit in that country (but in Germany and France many 
complained that real interest rates were too high). In turn, the Greek crisis had only a limited 
impact on credit growth in Germany, which came back into positive ground already in 2011 
and stayed well above the eurozone average in 2012. We have highlighted in the figure the 
main turning points in the ECB policy stance, which clearly respond to monetary 
development in the centre, but on occasion seem less felicitous in view of the periphery 
economic conditions. For instance, the turn to restriction in 2006 does not arrive till credit 
accelerates in Germany, but probably too late to slow excessive credit growth in the 
periphery. In two instances, in 2008 and 2011, the ECB raised interest rates at the wrong time, 
in view of rapidly falling credit growth in the periphery, but probably consistent with 
developments in Germany. Similarly, the decline in interest rates in 2011 and 2012 was less 
aggressive than would have been justified by plummeting credit growth in the periphery.  
Figure 4. Credit to the private non-financial sector (annual growth rates, %) 
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Source: BIS, quarterly data. Credit is defined as total credit from all lending sectors to non-financial 
corporations, households and non-profit institutions serving households. The PIIGS aggregate is calculated 
based on country shares in total GDP. 
These developments highlight the difficulty of managing diverse economies with one 
monetary policy. The eurozone economy is segmented along national lines by market 
rigidities of various sorts that lead to persistently divergent inflation rates; rather than 
bringing them more in line with one another, in its early years the single monetary policy has 
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accommodated and fuelled the divergence (Goodhart, 2014). But then, after market 
sentiment turned around and financial investors started to doubt the sustainability of 
sovereign debts of certain eurozone members, monetary and financial conditions in the 
periphery became overly restrictive and combined with budgetary austerity in aggravating 
the fall in economic activity.   
This divergence is highlighted by the evolution of real interest rates on long-term (10-year) 
government bonds (Figure 5), which is determined by three components: the level of 
(nominal) German interest rates – the nominal anchor – a risk premium reflecting investors’ 
assessment of the future evolution of government budgets and economic fundamentals in 
the other (peripheral) eurozone members, and national inflation rates. The paramount role in 
determining real interest rates was in practice played by the risk premium, which at some 
point for some peripheral countries came to incorporate the risk of sovereign default cum 
‘redenomination’ of national debts, i.e. of exit from the euro.   
Figure 5. Real long-term interest rates (%) 
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As may be seen, real interest rates in the periphery fell below the German interest rate 
already in the late 1990s, as the risk premium fell abruptly in anticipation of the inception of 
the euro – which initially removed as if by a stroke of a pen the risk of exchange rate 
depreciation and possibly also, in investors’ eyes, of peripheral sovereign debts. A further 
contribution to the decline in real interest rates in the periphery came from the acceleration 
calculated as: 
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of relative inflation, earlier on more strongly in Ireland, then in Spain (the housing boom) 
and in Italy (due to wage inflation and decelerating productivity). In Ireland (already since 
the late 1990s and up until 2004) and in Spain (in the mid-2000s) real interest rates fell below 
zero. 
Then market sentiment turned around. In Ireland and Spain, where real and financial 
imbalances had been building up intensely, they started to rise steeply even before the 
Lehman crisis, in Italy mostly after the inception of the Greek crisis. In all instances, the 
reassessment of the risk of investing in the peripheral countries was dramatic, bringing 
about much higher real interest rates at the very time when the economy started to plunge 
and fiscal policies turned increasingly restrictive. Cross-border interbank funding and 
wholesale money markets seized up, basically impairing the functioning of banking and 
securities markets in a number of peripheral countries and aggravating the credit crunch. 
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy all but ceased to operate. 
In Germany, on the other hand, real interest rates came down gently to support economic 
activity in the mid-1990s, went down even more as the economy weakened after the Lehman 
shock, and then even moved into negative territory, indicating strong monetary stimulus, to 
counter persistent recessionary and deflationary forces taking hold of the economy. 
Thus, in view of prevailing economic conditions, it appears that monetary policy was about 
right in the core of the eurozone during much of the past decade but was strongly pro-
cyclical in the periphery, where it accommodated and indeed fed the build-up of imbalances 
up until the mid-2000s, and then amplified deflationary forces after the inception of the 
financial crisis. Of course, the fact that on average the monetary stance reflected largely 
developments in the core countries is neither surprising nor unreasonable, given their weight 
in the eurozone total economy (about 70%), but it does entail some unpleasant consequences 
for monetary and financial stability within the eurozone.  
As has been shown, the divergence in monetary conditions was driven by the risk premium 
demanded by investors to hold the sovereign debt of the periphery – too little up until 2007, 
too large after the inception of the Greek sovereign crisis in 2010. The reasons have been well 
explained by De Grauwe (2011a and 2011b). In a monetary union without fiscal union, such 
as the eurozone, national governments issue bonds, as it were, in a ‘foreign’ currency, since 
individually they have no control over its availability to counter a liquidity crisis in their 
sovereign debt market. The absence of such a guarantee makes sovereign bond markets 
prone to liquidity crises and contagion, very much like banking systems lacking a lender of 
last resort. 
When the Greek sovereign debt crisis surfaced in spring 2010, investors started to fear that 
other sovereigns might have difficulties in serving their debt. Investors’ apprehensions were 
dramatically aggravated by a new policy – announced in Deauville in October 2010 by 
Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy – requiring the involvement of the private sector 
(PSI) in any sovereign restructurings. The new policy was first implemented on the occasion 
of the second Greek rescue package (summer-fall 2011), leading to large losses by private 
investors. As investors fled sovereign debt markets and contagion spread to other peripheral 
countries, interest rates on some sovereigns rose to levels such that their solvency was called 
into question. This ‘bad equilibrium’ was not the result of a sudden deterioration of 
peripheral governments’ budgetary positions, but simply of a perverse turn of investors’ 
expectations driven by fears that the ECB might not be able or willing to intervene to restore 
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orderly liquidity conditions in distressed markets. The question of the ECB role as lender of 
last resort in sovereign debt markets had come to occupy centre stage. 
4. The ECB responses to financial shocks  
There were two distinct phases in the financial crisis in the Eurozone. In 2008-09 the post-
Lehman shock emanating from US capital markets was met without special strains in 
internal cohesion – as reflected in only mildly widening spreads between Eurozone markets 
(Figure 5). Just like the Federal Reserve and the other main central banks, the ECB reacted by 
lowering interest rates and massively expanded its refinancing operations for the banking 
system. Its lending of last resort operations with the banking system were massive and 
effective, with little disagreement within the Governing Council.   
Figure 6. The balance sheet of the Federal Reserve and the ECB (2003-15; trillions of dollars or euros) 
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Source: ECB and FRED (Economic Data, St. Louis FED), weekly data. 
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Between October 2008 and May 2009 the ECB cut its main refinancing rate by 325 basis 
points, down to 1%. It also adopted a number of credit enhancement measures to mitigate the 
impact of collapsing wholesale and interbank markets. Starting in October 2008, the MROs 
and LTROs were granted on a full allotment and fixed rate basis, so that all demand for 
liquidity would be satisfied at a stable cost as long as adequate collateral was available. The 
maximum maturity of LTROs was raised first to six and then (May 2009) to 12 months (three 
LTROs, taken up for over €500 billion). The ECB also launched its first Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme (CBPP1) in order to revive a market normally representing a primary 
source of funding for European banks, which had dried up in terms both of liquidity and 
issuance; under the programme it purchased some €60 billion of securities. Collateral 
requirements were repeatedly eased by lowering the minimum acceptable rating and 
extending the list of eligible paper. The balance of the ECB shot-up to over €2 trillion (Figure 6). 
Financial tensions then started to ease until, early in 2010, the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
unsettled market conditions by raising increasing doubts among investors as to whether the 
country, and possibly other highly indebted countries, would be pushed into default and 
perhaps out of the euro.  
In order to tame extreme market turbulence, in May 2010 the ECB launched its Securities 
Market Programme (SMP) – its first foray into distressed sovereign bonds markets – under 
which it would buy unspecified amounts of sovereign bonds in secondary markets “whose 
depth and liquidity were impaired” (Eser & Schwaab, 2013); the interventions were to be 
sterilised by offsetting sales of interest-bearing deposits to the banking system so that the 
monetary policy stance would not be affected.16 The ECB did not disclose the total amount 
that would be spent, a time frame for the purchases, and the set of securities to be targeted, 
which in all likelihood much weakened their market impact.  
The purchases under the programme were by and large concentrated in May-June 2010 and 
August-November 2011, and the programme was inactive for long stretches of time (Figure 
7).17 It was interrupted in March 2011, apparently in retaliation after the European Council 
failed to agree on granting the nascent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) the power to 
intervene in the sovereign bond secondary markets, to the utter dismay of the ECB (Bastasin, 
2015).  
It was resumed in August, with sizeable purchases of Italian and Spanish sovereigns, with 
some positive effects on spreads in unsettled market conditions, but was again suspended 
for Italian sovereigns as it became clear that the Berlusconi government was not delivering 
on its promised economic reforms. In September 2012 the programme was discontinued and 
was substituted by the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT). Under the SMP, the ECB 
came to hold a maximum of €220 billion of securities, which were gradually reduced as 
tension eased (to €138 billion as of May 2015). In October 2011, at the height of tensions on 
Italian and Spanish sovereign markets, the ECB also announced that it would buy an 
additional €40 billion of covered bonds (CBPP2). 
                                                     
16
 Cf. 5 October 2010 ECB press release (www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/ 
pr100510.en.html). 
17
 See Eser & Schwaab (2013) and Fawley & Neely (2013).  
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Figure 7. The ECB Securities Market Programme 
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In fall 2011, as a predictable reaction to the Greek PSI, the sovereign crisis started to mutate 
into a banking crisis, as investors eyed the potential repercussions of a sovereign default on 
the solvency of banking institutions with large exposures to sovereign risks; the emerging 
banking crisis in turn worsened the market assessments of sovereign solvency, as investors 
factored in the prospect of further capital injections by governments into the banking system 
to keep banks afloat. The doom loop between sovereign and banking crises had set in. Soon 
the major agencies started to downgrade in parallel the ratings of sovereigns and banks, 
adding to market strains; interbank and wholesale money market funding to banks in the 
periphery seized up. The crunch was aggravated by the ill-timed decision by the EU Heads 
of State and Government (in October 2011, acting on a proposal by the EBA) to require banks 
to raise their capital to a 9% regulatory ratio,18 entailing increased capital requirements of 
about €100 billion. 
In a rapidly deteriorating environment, the ECB rushed to accommodate the funding needs 
of banks. The minimum reserve requirement was lowered from 2% to 1%. In addition, the 
ECB launched two ‘very-long-term’ refinancing operations (VLTROs) – in December 2011 
and February 2012 – with a maturity of three years; the amount drawn totalled over €1 
                                                     
18
 Cf. Statement of EU Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 26 October 2011 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125621.pdf). 
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trillion, with the largest share going to Italian and Spanish banks (which in turn used it to 
some extent to expand their portfolios of national sovereigns, thus earning the large spreads 
between ECB financing and distressed sovereigns). The balance sheet of the ECB shot up 
(Figure 6). 
The state of distress and mutual mistrust within the banking system was reflected in 
Eurosystem banks parking close to €600 billion with the ECB to maintain a cushion of 
liquidity rather than lend it. New measures were also adopted to relax the constraints on 
eligible collateral, in response to the progressive reduction of sovereign ratings to non-
investment grade (sovereign paper plays a crucial role in providing the banks with collateral 
when they borrow from their NCBs).19 
At this very time when the crisis was heating up, in spring and summer 2011, the ECB twice 
raised its reference rate (altogether by 50 basis points) to counter accelerating inflation and 
rapid credit growth in Germany and other core countries. The infelicitous move was 
reversed before the year’s end. 
Rather than subsiding after the large injections of liquidity by the ECB, tensions continued to 
build in the first semester of 2012. Government bond yields in a number of eurozone 
countries reached new heights, increasingly incorporating a ‘redenomination’ risk premium, 
i.e. the possibility of some participants being forced to leave the euro. Eventually, the 
prospect of collapse of the entire eurozone led the European Council and the Euro-summit in 
June 2012 to launch the banking union project, designed to break the bank-sovereign doom 
loop; while the German government let it be known that the exit of Greece from the 
eurozone was no longer an option.  
Against this background, on 26 July ECB President Mario Draghi stated in a speech to 
investors at Lancaster House, in London, that the ECB was “ready to do whatever it takes to 
preserve the euro”.20 This was followed, early in September, by the announcement of the 
OMT programme, under which the ECB and NCBs would be prepared to intervene for 
unlimited amounts in secondary sovereign-bond markets of specific eurozone members, 
with no pre-specified time limit. With this announcement, de facto, the ECB set itself as the 
lender of last resort standing behind eurozone sovereigns in case of large idiosyncratic 
financial shocks. These interventions, however, would only be initiated after the country 
concerned had signed up to an economic programme with the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) or the ESM, entailing “strict and effective conditionality”.21  
                                                     
19
 The ECB Governing Council reacted initially by exempting the government bonds and the private sector 
securities guaranteed by those governments from the minimum rating requirements on a case by case basis; 
then, in May 2013, the ECB generalised these exemptions by waiving the rating requirement for countries 
supported by, and compliant with, an EU-IMF adjustment programme. Rating requirements for ABS, which had 
not been touched in the first wave of collateral enhancement in 2008, were lowered from Triple A to Single A 
(December 2011), and then to Triple B (one notch above non-investment grade, June 2012) for a broad range 
of securities backed by residential and commercial mortgages, loans to SMEs, car loans, leasing and consumer 
loans. In December 2011 the ECB also adopted an Additional Credit Claims Framework under which individual 
NCBs were allowed to accept, at their own risk, credit claims of even lower quality, provided they specified 
their own eligibility criteria and had them approved by the ECB. Seven NCBs made use of this option, notably 
including the Bank of France and the Bank of Italy. 
20
 www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.  
21
 M. Draghi (2012), Introductory statement to the press conference, Frankfurt am Main, 6 September 
(www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html). 
16  STEFANO MICOSSI 
 
This can take the form of a full macroeconomic adjustment programme or, under certain 
conditions, of a ‘precautionary’ programme; in either case it must include the possibility of 
primary market debt purchases by the EFSF/ESM.22 Some analysts have considered that this 
clause may cast a shadow over the credibility of OMT, as it could be difficult to activate it in 
practice, e.g. in the presence of a banking crisis requiring swift action (De Grauwe, 2013; 
Wyplosz, 2013). The possibility of a precautionary programme may offer a way out, but 
requires the government’s willingness to sign up to a memorandum of understanding on 
adjustment measures with the ESM well before the country has its back against the wall – 
something only far-sighted politicians may be willing to do. Fortunately, the programme 
implementation was never tested and financial markets took the ECB announcement at face 
value.  
Gradually, spreads on distressed sovereigns started to come down and the cross-border 
funding flows for peripheral banks came back to life. Thus, the OMT really marked a turning 
point in the eurozone sovereign debt crisis – confirming beyond all doubt that the sovereign 
and banking crisis post-2010 really had been the product of ill-designed monetary 
institutions, rather than reckless budgetary polices of some member states.  
Financial fragmentation started to recede, but not entirely owing to lingering doubts about 
the strength of banks’ balance sheets and the legacy of non-performing assets left by the 
crisis. This problem was to be further addressed by the banking union, legally in force since 
the end of 2014, and its attendant comprehensive review of the balance sheets and business 
models of the banks to be supervised by the ECB. 
Figure 8 can shed some light on the impact of the ECB extraordinary measures to beef up the 
system’s liquidity and their impact on monetary base. In the early years of the euro the ratios 
of base money to GDP increased, probably reflecting the large increase in financial 
intermediation (financialisation), while the ratio between base money and M3 was stable 
(with some cyclical changes early in the decade). With the crisis, the two curves fluctuated in 
tandem, while the underlying ratio between M3 and GDP stayed fairly stable (see also 
Goodhart, 2014). Since the ECB was passively accommodating banks’ demand for liquid 
reserves (with the adoption of the fixed rate-full allotment system in MROs), the swings in 
the two curves must reflect swings in banks’ liquidity preference, and therefore do not entail 
much change in monetary conditions. As may be seen, the swings in banks’ demand for 
monetary base were much larger in 2010-12, when interbank and cross-border funding 
almost dried up in the periphery, than in 2008-10 (the post-Lehman shock), highlighting the 
intensity of the confidence crisis engendered by the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the 
critical role of the ECB extraordinary measures in avoiding a financial meltdown. 
 
                                                     
22
 As may be recalled, precautionary financial assistance by the ESM is meant to support sound policies and 
prevent crisis situations by intervening before the member state faces difficulties in accessing capital markets.  
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Figure 8. Base money (BM): ratios to GDP and M3 (%) 
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Source: ECB.  
 
Some important developments also worth mentioning concern ELA, the emergency support 
lines available to NCBs to individual banks confronting a temporary liquidity crisis (but 
deemed to be solvent). As already mentioned, this support is decided by NCBs, but requires 
an ECB authorisation, which may be denied or limited when the Governing Council 
considers that such financing may affect the conduct of monetary policy. Absent official 
statistics, private estimates indicate substantial recourse to ELA in 2010-12 by Greece and 
Ireland (and to a lesser extent by Belgium and later by Cyprus), but in the main this stayed 
consistent with the statutory goal of supporting individual banks (albeit perhaps of dubious 
solvency).23  
A different scenario has unfolded in 2015 when, in the context of difficult negotiations 
between the newly elected Greek government led by the radical leftist party Syriza, the 
suspension of the bail-out programme obliged the ECB to exclude Greek sovereigns from the 
list of securities acceptable as collateral. The ECB had no alternative, since the general waiver 
on sovereign collateral that it may grant when there is an economic adjustment programme 
could no longer apply. As a result, central bank funding for Greek banks could be made 
available only under ELA; and access was permitted only up to a tight cap decided by the 
Governing Council and modified on a weekly basis. Thus, de facto, the ELA facility has 
                                                     
23
 Wolff (2014). 
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become an aggregate emergency funding facility, with the ECB maintaining a tight lid on 
access in light of evolving negotiations on corrective economic policy measures between 
Greece and European institutions.  
A final feature worth stressing in the institutional set-up of the Eurosystem made visible by 
the crisis has been the emergence of large net creditor and debtor positions of NCBs vis-à-vis 
the ECB, i.e. the so-called ‘Target’ balances. Target is the settlement system for euro 
transactions between the banks of the eurozone, which are channelled through the NCBs and 
therefore give rise to net creditor and debtor positions of the NCBs at the ECB (Sinn, 2014). 
When the sovereign debt crisis struck, and private cross-border financial flows to the 
eurozone periphery came to a halt, to an extent Target became the compensating financing 
item in the external accounts of eurozone peripheral members with current payment deficits, 
buying time for their reduction and relaxing the credit constraint, as may be seen in Figure 9. 
In 2011 and 2012, Target provided much of the financing of balance of payments 
disequilibria, together with official assistance by the EFSF and the IMF.  
The counterpart to these financial flows were large increases in creditor balances of Germany 
and other core countries, which in the meantime were experiencing large surpluses in both 
the current and the private capital accounts. In 2013 intra-eurozone current imbalances 
basically disappeared, but peripheral countries still had to confront substantial net private 
capital outflows; Target financing and official assistance continued to fill the gap. With the 
sole exception of Greece, resort to Target and official assistance by peripheral countries 
subsided in 2014, as financial market conditions normalised after the introduction of OMT.   
Figure 9. The financing of eurozone payments imbalances (2008-13) 
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Note: Core countries are Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland. 
Source: CESiFo database for Target 2 and Eurostat for current account; IMF, EFSF/ESM for official assistance 
programmes; net private capital flows are calculated as in Merler & Pisani-Ferri (2012).  
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Two remarks are in order. First, when a eurozone member comes under attack, private 
capital may flow out through the Target channel without penalty, as long as national banks 
do not run out of eligible collateral to bring to their NCBs, or the country introduces capital 
controls (as in the Cyprus crisis). This is the channel through which private creditors of Irish, 
Greek, Portuguese and Spanish banks managed to get out largely unscathed even after 
private channels of intermediation had effectively closed.  
Second, as a result of the developments that have been described, creditor countries found 
themselves with large claims on the ECB, over €1 trillion, almost exactly corresponding to 
the debt accumulated with the ECB by the struggling periphery (Sinn, 2014). Later on, as the 
current external deficits were eliminated and private financial flows cross-border resumed, 
the accumulated Target imbalances came down but have not been fully reabsorbed; to an 
extent their reduction has reflected the disbursement of financial assistance under the 
EFSF/ESM adjustment programmes, rather than the reversal of underlying financing flows.  
In fact, once they have been accumulated, Target balances remain open and there is no 
settlement mechanism; for the sake of comparison, it may be recalled that in the US system, 
Target-like balances in the payment system must be settled at least annually. As a 
consequence, Target entails a measure of risk-sharing, since in case of the default of a 
eurozone member, the losses will be borne by the remaining members through their share in 
the ECB capital (Sinn, 2014).  
5. Setting the stage for unconventional policies  
The speech by President Draghi at the Central Bank Symposium in Jackson Hole in August 
201424 marked a new turn in ECB polices, one could say from passive monetary 
accommodation of the gyration in the demand for liquidity by the banking system to active 
expansionary push, a development not only unprecedented in the short history of the 
institution, but also unthinkable under the orthodox view nurtured in the Bundesbank. 
Resistance to active expansion within the ECB Governing Council had been strong all along, 
and it is well reflected in the systematically slower pace of official interest rate reductions 
relative to the other main central banks from 2009 almost to the end of 2013 (Figure 10) – 
sending out a signal of persistent relative monetary restriction that in all likelihood played an 
important role in keeping the euro exchange rate unreasonably high ever since the inception 
of the financial crisis. Indeed, when its balance sheet started to shrink after the OMT 
announcement, this was seen by the ECB as a sign of welcome normalisation of financial 
conditions, but the negative impact of high interest rates on the demand for liquidity by the 
banking system was overlooked – and monetary policy remained too tight.    
                                                     
24
 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140822.en.html. 
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Figure 10. Official interest rates (2007-15, %) 
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Source: FED, ECB, BoJ and BoE. 
 
In his speech, Draghi said that expansionary “demand side policies are not only justified by 
the significant cyclical component in unemployment…[but also to] help ensure against the 
risk that a weak economy is contributing to hysteresis effects”. And, he added, “[T]he risks 
of doing too little – i.e. that cyclical unemployment becomes structural – outweigh those of 
doing too much – that is, excessive upward wage and price pressures”. He went on to say 
that monetary policy would have to play a central role in supporting demand, “which 
currently means an accommodative monetary policy for an extended period of time” – while 
also calling for appropriately supportive fiscal and structural policies.  
A number of carefully crafted official statements prepared the ground for the new monetary 
policy measures by explaining at length the rationale behind them and the measures that 
would be resorted to under different circumstances. Most revealing is the speech delivered 
by Draghi in Amsterdam in April 2014,25 where he explained that “when central banks come 
up against the effective lower [zero] bound [for short-term interest rates], the possibility 
disappears to use current changes in the short rate to signal the policy response to a 
changing inflation outlook…Thus, it becomes more important to communicate directly about 
future interest rate changes…i.e. to give forward guidance. Second…to accurately steer 
                                                     
25
 M. Draghi (2014), “Monetary policy communication in turbulent times”, Speech at the Conference De 
Nederlandsche Bank 200 years: Central banking in the next two decades, Amsterdam, 24 April 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140424.en.html). 
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expectations across a wide array of measures, more active communication on our reaction 
function is needed”. Accordingly, “an unwarranted tightening of monetary policy stance 
(from developments in [financial] or foreign exchange markets)… could be tackled through 
more conventional measures”, while a further impairment in the transmission channels of 
monetary policy could be met by a targeted LTROs (TLTROs) or ABS purchase programme, 
and a worsening of the medium term outlook for inflation “would warrant a more broad-
based asset purchase programme”. 
In the second and third quarter of 2014 the eurozone economy unexpectedly stalled, with 
some peripheral countries falling again in recession. Headline inflation rates continued to 
creep downward, with negative rates spreading to more countries and fuelling fears of price 
deflation. Growing current external surpluses in Germany – which had stayed above 6% of 
GDP already since 2012 and were increasingly translating into eurozone surpluses as 
peripheral external deficits were eliminated by domestic deflation – were adding to upward 
pressures on the euro, whose dollar exchange in the first quarter of 2014 rose to almost $1.40. 
In turn, this was exacerbating the deceleration in domestic prices via their import 
component, just at the time when oil and other commodity prices were nose-diving (Figure 
11): indeed, as may be seen, the ‘core’ component (excluding energy and food imports) of the 
HCPI remained above 1% until the third quarter of 2013, and never fell below 0.5% even in 
2014 and early 2015. However, the ECB was worried about the potential knock-on effects on 
wage and price setting. Furthermore, already in April the closely watched indicator of 
inflation expectations – the five years on five years (5y-on-5y) inflation-linked swap rate – 
had fallen below 2% (Figure 12), indicating to the ECB that medium-term inflation 
expectations were no longer ‘anchored’ at the medium-term price stability target.    
Figure 11. HCPI headline and ‘core’ inflation (annual percentage change) 
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Source: Eurostat, monthly data. 
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Figure 12. Inflation expectation measured by the inflation linked swap rates 
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Source: Our calculations on Bloomberg, Daily data. 
 
The decisions of the ECB in the ensuing months closely followed the Amsterdam 
announcement.26 Over summer 2014, the interest rates on MROs and on the deposit facility 
were lowered by 20 basis points, respectively to 0.05% and to -0.20%, while the rate on the 
marginal lending facility was reduced by 45 basis points, to 0.30%, in line with the 
Governing Council’s forward guidance.27 A new series of TLTROs were announced in June, 
with ECB funding tied to the provision of credit to the real economy. This funding was made 
available through two windows, in September and December, to be followed by further 
windows between March 2015 and June 2016. It was provided for up to four years, initially 
with a small surcharge over the MROs rate (10 basis points), which was subsequently 
eliminated (in January 2015).  
However, the take-up of the lines was less than full (altogether, about €212 billion), while the 
total liquidity provided by the ECB to the banking system actually declined in the last 
quarter of 2014 – a clear indication of continuing weakness in the demand for credit by the 
economy and, at the same time, of the gradual normalisation of bank funding conditions in 
capital markets. The contrast with the VLTROs offered at the end of 2011 and beginning of 
2012 could not be starker: in that case demand topped €1 trillion, as interbank funding 
                                                     
26
 Cf. ECB (2015). 
27
 Cf. the box “The Governing Council forward guidance on the key ECB interest rates”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, 
July 2013.  
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channels were seizing up; the new VLTROs, on the other hand, were rather used to 
substitute existing financing lines at more favourable conditions, while net resort by the 
banks to the ECB was actually falling. The ECB was ‘pushing on a string’, the celebrated 
expression used by Keynes to describe his ‘liquidity trap’: a situation in which the interest 
elasticity of banks’ demand for liquidity is infinity, in the vicinity of the interest rate lower 
bound, and therefore increasing the supply of banks’ reserves has no effect.28 
In fall 2014 the ECB also launched two private sector asset purchase programmes, an asset-
backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP, starting in November) and a new covered 
bond purchase programme (CBPP3, starting in October), both expected to last for at least 
two years. In both cases, the purpose was to encourage greater lending to the private sector 
by strengthening the incentive to supply loans that could be securitised at attractive 
conditions (in markets still largely impaired) and by facilitating bank funding at comparable 
terms. The amounts involved were initially rather small (altogether, about €32 billion by end-
2014), but the purchases were to continue at a stable rate of €10 billion per month. 
Eventually, the continued weakness of the economy and the repeated downward revisions in 
the HCPI rate of increase, which in December 2014 turned negative for the eurozone average, 
catalysed a broad consensus in the ECB Governing Council to take the plunge into 
quantitative easing (QE). On 22 January 2015, they announced the decision to launch an 
expanded asset purchase programme (EAPP) under which the ESCB would purchase every 
month €60 billion of private and government securities assets – thus including the two 
programmes already started the previous fall – for a period beginning in March 2015 and 
ending in September 2016. Before describing in detail the new measures, it seems useful to 
discuss briefly what precisely is meant by unconventional monetary policies and how they 
are expected to work.  
6. What unconventional policies?  
The definition of unconventional monetary policy measures has varied considerably across 
the central banks undertaking them and over time. Initially, in the wake of the Lehman 
failure and, in the eurozone, of the exploding sovereign debt crisis (starting in 2010), the 
unconventional measures undertaken by the central banks were mainly aimed at stabilising 
specific segments of financial systems, which had been impaired; they are sometimes 
referred to as ‘credit easing’ (Bini Smaghi, 2009). Notable examples are the SMP and VLTROs 
programmes, and similarly the backup facilities established by the Federal Reserve for the 
commercial paper market and money market mutual funds in the wake of the Lehman 
failure. These interventions were undertaken well before short rates hit their lower bound 
and may be seen as an extension of the lending of last resort function of central banks. Later 
on, the focus shifted to stimulating real growth and combating deflation, as short interest 
rates descended to the lower bound. In these circumstances, the discussion about 
unconventional monetary policies has focused on how best to overcome the lower interest 
rate bound and effectively stimulate the economy.29 
                                                     
28
 The expression “pushing on a string” was first used by Congressman T. Alan Goldsborough in March 1935 
during a hearing of the Federal Reserve Chairman Marriner Eccles on the 1935 Banking Act. Cf. Wood (2006). 
29
 A detailed description of measures undertaken by the main four central banks – in the US, the UK, the 
eurozone and Japan – to overcome the financial crisis is provided by Fawley & Neely (2013); however, they fail 
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Normally, monetary policy acts by setting a target for the interest rate in the overnight 
interbank or money market rate, and then adjusting the supply of central bank money to 
achieve that target. The US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England mainly operate through 
sales and purchases of securities in the money market, while the ECB and the Bank of Japan 
mainly operate through bank refinancing operations. Therefore, the central bank is not 
engaged in lending to the government or the private sector. However, once an extraordinary 
shock has brought short-term interest rates close to zero, there is no further room to lower 
short rates (since the alternative to hold cash rather than negative-yield deposits is readily 
available to the public), and therefore the normal transmission mechanism from lower 
interest rates to higher aggregate demand for consumption and investment is muted. 
In these circumstances the central bank may still try to stir up the economy and inflation by 
pushing down long-term interest rates, which typically remain positive even after short rates 
have fallen to zero. Two different transmission channels may be identified in this regard 
(Bernanke, 2012; Rajan, 2013). The central bank may seek to influence interest rate 
expectations by committing to a protracted period of low policy rates (forward guidance); or it 
may aim at directly altering the price of long-term securities by purchasing them outright 
and thus setting in motion a sequence of asset substitutions in private portfolios (portfolio 
balance effect). The two transmission channels are not mutually exclusive and in practice 
complement each other; in both cases there would be a flattening of the yield curve. To this 
end, the supply of central bank money – the overall size of the central bank’s balance sheet – 
must greatly increase, which is why these policies are commonly referred to as quantitative 
easing (QE). A large increase in supply of base money has thus become the characterising 
feature of unconventional policies, whose operational targets are commonly announced as 
planned asset purchases over set time horizons, together with the resulting expansion of the 
central bank balance sheet. 
Both the interest rate expectation and the portfolio balance effects are predicated on the 
existence of some market imperfection. The former effect may come about to the extent that 
long-term interest rates are kept higher than the equilibrium rate by private roll-over 
investment strategies based on higher-than-equilibrium expected short-term rates. The 
central bank may then convince private agents to lower their expected path of short rates by 
committing to hold policy rates lower for a longer period than implied by policy rules 
developed for normal times, e.g. the Taylor rule.30 In a sense, for this announcement effect to 
work, the central bank must publicly commit to being ‘irresponsible’ (Fawley & Neely, 2013). 
The problem with forward guidance is that it is time inconsistent, which may lower its 
credibility: once the employment or inflation prospects start to improve, the central bank 
may find itself under strong pressure to abandon its previous commitment. In this 
connection there has been some discussion in the literature on economic incentives that 
might help to tie down the central bank to its promises, such as the fear of losing money on 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to establish a clear distinction between monetary policies to meet the post-Lehman emergency and monetary 
policies to overcome the lower bound on interest rates.  
30 The Taylor rule for optimal monetary policy was proposed in 1993 by Prof. John Taylor of Stanford 
University, as follows:  where  is the target short-term 
nominal interest rate, e.g. the federal funds rate in the US,  is the rate of inflation as measured by the 
GDP deflator,  is the desired rate of inflation, is the assumed equilibrium real interest rate,  is 
the logarithm of real GDP, and  is the logarithm of potential output, as determined by a linear trend. 
Cf. Taylor (1993). 
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its securities portfolio if it tried to unwind its securities portfolio too early. However, large 
losses on its portfolio could equally well be brought about by spreading expectations of 
runaway inflation. One way out of this conundrum was seen in taking as a policy target a 
real economic variable, such as the rate of unemployment; this was eventually the approach 
taken by the Federal Reserve in 2012 and by the Bank of England in 2013. 
The other transmission channel, the portfolio balance effect,31 assumes that long-term interest 
rates incorporate a term premium, due to an imperfect substitutability of securities in private 
investors’ portfolios along the term structure of interest rates. This may be due to such 
factors as idiosyncratic private preferences (‘preferred habitat’), market structural features 
(high transaction or hedging costs of certain securities), and regulatory restrictions on the 
type of securities that may be held by certain investors, e.g. pension funds. Imperfect 
substitutability in turn implies that changes in the supply of assets available to private 
investors will affect their price and yield. In the main, the real economic effects may be 
plausibly expected to derive from a shift of private portfolios to stocks (in general, to riskier 
securities), real estate and foreign assets – this last shift also bringing about a depreciation of 
the exchange rate with attendant increase in net foreign demand for domestic goods, services 
and real assets. 
The effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy in lowering interest rates and changing 
investors’ portfolio allocation in favour of stocks has now been established by extensive 
empirical research; the inception of unconventional policies has also been normally 
accompanied by large exchange rate depreciations – a source of significant frictions with 
other currency areas32 – which were later reversed when the economy started to recover, e.g. 
the US dollar in 2014. Figure 13, drawn from the 2015 Spring Global Financial Stability 
Report (GFSR), summarises the latest IMF estimates of the impact of QE on long interest 
rates, stock prices and the exchange rate in the US, Japan and the eurozone. Estimates for UK 
markets are provided by Christensen & Rudebusch (2012)33 and Joyce et al. (2011). Long 
interest rates came down on average by around 100 basis points in the US and UK markets 
(where the Bank of England engineered a quadrupling of the money base in 2008-09),34 and 
even more in the eurozone; in the latter area, the effect has been larger in countries where 
long rates had been higher, leading to a substantial reduction in interest rate spreads over 
the German bonds. In Japan the decline of long interest rates since the announcement of QE 
in April 2013 has been minimal.  
                                                     
31
 The classical reference for this mechanism is Tobin (1969). The portfolio balance effect would be muted in 
the frictionless worlds of Modigliani-Miller and full internalisation by private investors of the government’s 
balance sheet (Ricardian equivalence). The plausibility of these characterisations of investors’ behaviour in 
financial markets was always open to question, and has been undermined by the events leading to the financial 
crisis.  
32
 Just on the eve of the Federal Reserve announcement of a second wave of QE (QE2), the G20 meeting in mid-
October 2010 actually sanctioned that emerging countries flooded by inward capital flows could resort to 
capital controls.  
33
 The authors also provide estimates for the US. 
34
 Cf. Fawley & Neely (2013). 
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Figure 13. The QE effect on sovereign interest rates (10-year yields, left panel),  equities and exchange 
rate indexes (right panel) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2015a). 
 
In general, most of the effects on interest and exchange rates materialised in the early phases 
of the purchases. In the US, where between the end of 2008 and fall 2014 the Federal Reserve 
ran three waves of QE, interest rates declined under QE1 and QE2 but went into reverse with 
QE3, reflecting spreading expectations that QE was coming to an end.35 In the UK, most of 
the impact on long rates, i.e. 75 basis points out of a total around 100 basis points, came 
about shortly after the announcement of the first QE operation (Joyce et al., 2011). In the 
eurozone, as will be shown, the exchange rate had started to fall long before the adoption of 
QE, reflecting the combination of expected tightening by the Federal Reserve and expected 
easing by the ECB; long rates started to decline rather steeply in step with ECB 
announcements since late 2014, even before the ECB spent a single euro. An important role 
in enhancing the effectiveness of the ECB’s unconventional policies lies in the combination of 
QE with negative rates on bank deposits at the ECB, which strengthen the incentive for 
banks to look for other alternatives in the deployment of their liquidity.  
                                                     
35
 After share prices fell sharply in June 2011, in September the Federal Reserve responded with “Operation 
Twist”, under which it sold $400 billion in short government bonds and bought an equivalent amount of long 
bonds to further lower the long-term interest rate (which was already below 2%), initially with little effect on 
share prices. 
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The real economic impact of QE, on the other hand, remains controversial. Much 
ammunition was provided to the sceptics by the experience of Japan, whose early 
experiments with QE, in the early 1990s and the early 2000s, failed to revive economic 
activity. On this, Ito & Mishkin (2006) suggested that bungled announcements by the Bank of 
Japan and visible disagreements among top policy-makers in the bank and the government 
on the desirability of QE may have dramatically weakened the credibility of the 
unconventional measures. Even more troublesome seems the fact that in the US and the UK 
the economy continued to show little response. In the US, GDP started to increase steadily 
after the third quarter of 2011 while in the UK in January 2013. 
The answer to the puzzle, however, may lie elsewhere, as has been argued by Koo (2008 and 
2015).36 He points out that prolonged depression was the result of the private sector’s efforts 
to deleverage in order to repair balance sheets deeply impaired by the collapse of real estate 
and financial asset prices. The resulting sharp rise in saving rates, amounting to several 
percentage points of GDP, was initially offset by expansionary budgetary policies as the 
economy started to fall into recession, but the fiscal stimulus then subsided and failed to fill 
the hole in aggregate demand created by the fall in private spending. In such an 
environment, Koo argues that monetary policy can’t do much to revive private demand, due 
to the lack of willing borrowers, and reads the observed (large) increase in stock prices 
already in 2012 as a new asset price bubble, disconnected from the underlying future returns. 
Recent research by Borio et al. (2015) over 143 years of historical data (1870-2013) and 38 
countries confirms the important role of asset price (equity and real estate prices) in 
explaining large and persistent falls in output.37  
While this analysis is revealing, its conclusions may underestimate the positive effects of 
unconventional policies in facilitating and accelerating deleveraging, and hence in creating 
over time the conditions for a return of private spending. The April 2015 GFSR (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015a) and the World Economic Outlook (WEO, International Monetary 
Fund, 2015b) provide detailed analysis of the reduction in household and corporate debt 
(over GDP) in the US and the UK between 2007 and 2014 as a result of low nominal interest 
rates.38 It has also by now been established as a fact that the prolonged stagnation of the 
Japanese economy in the 1990s and 2000s is largely explained by its inability to restructure 
bad loans in the belly of the banking system;39 and indeed the IMF data show no reduction in 
leverage ratios for households and corporate in 2007-14. In the eurozone, the jury is still out, 
since QE has just started and deleveraging has not run its full course, with banks still 
encumbered by large non-performing loans in some peripheral countries, e.g. Italy.  
Figure 14 highlights, in this regard, the success of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England in pushing nominal 10-year interest rates below the nominal growth of GDP early 
in the aftermath of the Lehman failure. Specific measures to ease the predicaments of highly 
indebted households accelerated the deleveraging process. This was clearly not the case in 
Japan, where nominal GDP growth stayed below nominal interest rates through much of the 
                                                     
36
 See also Wolf (2014) for a masterly presentation of the same line of reasoning, together with compelling 
empirical evidence on the evolution of sectoral net savings balances country by country. 
37
 Over their full sample, they estimate that cumulative growth is about 10 percentage points lower after five 
years from peak prices.  
38
 Cf. IMF (2015a), Tables 1.1 and 1.2, pp. 13-14, and IMF (2015b), pp. 9-12.  
39
 Koo (2008).  
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2000s, including intermittently also after the launch in 2013 of the new QE programme by the 
Bank of Japan. In the eurozone, on the other hand, financial policies did not help reduce the 
interest burden, as long-term interest rates hovered well above nominal GDP growth rates 
through much of 2014.  
Figure 14. Nominal GDP growth and 10-year government bond yield 
 
Source: Bini Smaghi (2014). 
 
In sum, one cannot underestimate the importance of balance sheet repair and deleveraging 
in explaining the apparent slow response of the economy to monetary easing – notably in the 
banking system, where the stricter capital rules decided in Basel have combined with the 
need to clean up balance sheets in restraining the supply of credit. It does provide some 
support for the conclusion that “central bank securities purchases have provided meaningful 
support to the economic recovery while mitigating deflationary risks” (Bernanke, 2012).40  
The benefits for QE policies must also be weighed against the potential costs, on which a full 
picture will not be available for quite some time. The list of potential drawbacks includes the 
                                                     
40
 An entirely different question, which cannot be tackled here, is whether the economies of advanced 
countries will revert to their pre-crisis growth path, or more broadly what their long-term growth path is 
expected to be. On this, the spring 2015 WEO (International Monetary Fund, 2015b: Chapter 3) finds that 
potential output may have been permanently reduced by the crisis, mainly due to the sharp fall in investment 
in recent years. The responsiveness of wages to falling unemployment seems also to have declined, possibly 
weakening the impact of expansionary monetary policy on inflation. On this, cf. The Economist, “When what 
comes down doesn’t go up”, 2 May 2015. 
% 
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possible distortions in financial markets as a result of the central bank becoming a major 
security holder, which could reduce the depth and breadth of the relevant markets; the risk 
that QE might again encourage excessive risk-taking by private investors, in their search for 
returns; and the difficulty of reabsorbing the excess liquidity injected into the economy, due 
also to the potential instability that may derive from the unwinding of substantial holdings 
of fixed-rate securities of very long duration accumulated by private investors.  
This last aspect remains worrisome. In order to assuage investors’ fears, central banks have 
announced that they intend to keep their securities to maturity; thus the issue arises of how 
to reabsorb the substantial excess liquidity injected into the economy, once the abnormal 
demand for liquidity recedes. To this end, the ECB may resort to large issuances of term 
deposits; in case it didn’t succeed, this could endanger price stability and unleash inflation 
expectations, with great damage to central bank credibility.  
On the other hand, the US experience shows the potential for instability associated with the 
end of QE. When Chairman Bernanke announced, in June 2013, that the Federal Reserve 
might scale back its asset purchases, long rates shot up, generating waves of instability 
across domestic and international markets. Leveraged private investment in long-term 
securities carrying ultra-low fixed interest rates could compound the instability. The next 
perilous step is the first rise in official interest rates – which has been repeatedly pushed 
forward for fear of the consequences on the economy. At all events, these difficulties are real 
and require careful management of expectations by the central bank, but should not be 
exaggerated; after all, ‘tapering’ of asset purchases by the Federal Reserve (completed in 
October 2014) has been eventually ‘digested’ by financial markets without major disruptions.  
In sum, we can conclude that resort to QE was probably unavoidable in the presence of 
rising risks of deflation and balance sheet depression, and that it has helped the recovery; 
however, it may also entail a legacy of distortions and potential threats to financial stability 
that could come back to haunt world financial markets in a not-so-distant future.  
7. The ECB turns the QE spigot on  
On 22 January 2015 President Draghi announced the Governing Council’s decision to step up 
monetary expansion by undertaking the EAPP, comprising the two securities purchase 
programmes already under way (the asset back securities and covered bond purchase 
programmes) and a new public sector bonds purchase programme (PSPP) under which the 
Eurosystem will purchase monthly €50 billion of securities in the secondary market over the 
period from March 2015 to September 2016. The ECB has also undertaken to continue its 
purchases under the programme thereafter in case the rate of increase of the HCPI did not 
show by then “a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation which is consistent with our 
aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term”.41 The overall 
value of securities to be purchased would thus be at least €1.14 trillion, or 11% of eurozone 
GDP, bringing the ECB balance sheet back to where it has been at the crisis peak, early in 
2012 (see Figure 6).  
The public sector securities purchases will amount to €950 billion and will include bonds 
issued by the member states and certain national agencies (€836 billion) and by certain 
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 M. Draghi (2015), Introductory statement to the press conference, Frankfurt am Main, 22 January 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html). 
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European institutions (€114 billion). National agencies and institutions whose bonds will be 
eligible for Eurosystem purchases are included in a list published by the ECB on its website, 
which may be amended “on the basis of monetary policy considerations and duly reflecting 
risk management issues”.42 The securities will be purchased by NCBs, under the 
coordination of the ECB Governing Council, which has retained full control over the 
programme design. Out of the total additional purchases under the PSPP, 8% of sovereigns 
(€4 billion) and 12% of securities of European institutions (€6 billion) will be held by the ECB 
on its own accounts and therefore will be subject to full risk-sharing; the national public 
securities (€40 billion per month) to be purchased by NCBs will be allocated to individual 
central banks on the basis of their shares in the ECB’s capital key and will not be subject to 
loss sharing. Table 1 summarises the main figures of the EAPP and their risk sharing 
arrangements.43 
Table 1. The allocation of monthly asset purchases by the Eurosystem 
Bonds Bondholder Monthly 
purchases 
Total 
purchases 
Notes 
ABS & covered 
bonds 
ECB €10 bn €190 bn Risk on ECB 
European 
institutions 
ECB 
€6 bn 
(12% of 50) 
€114 bn Risk on ECB 
Euro area central 
governments and 
agencies 
ECB 
€4 bn 
(8% of 50) 
€76 bn Risk on ECB 
Euro area central 
governments and 
agencies 
NCBs 
securities purchases 
allocated according 
to the ECB’s capital 
key 
€40 bn 
(80% of 50) 
€760 bn 
Risk on NCBs; 
purchases to be limited to 
25% of new issues and 33% 
of total outstanding debt 
Total 
 
€60 bn €1.14 tr 
 
 
The compromise reached on risk-sharing was probably unavoidable in order to build a 
broad consensus on QE within the Governing Council; it leaves the eventual losses of a 
sovereign default squarely on the NCBs. By diminishing risk spreads and market 
fragmentation, QE will reduce the likelihood of such an event, and therefore the issue may 
not be relevant in practice; however, should serious distress like that experienced in 2011-12 
remerge within the eurozone, the Eurosystem might be exposed to a new ‘diabolical loop’ 
between national central banks and their governments, which would not only negate the 
separation between monetary and fiscal policy mandated by the EU Treaty but could truly 
break the monetary union (Gros & Kopf, 2015).44 
                                                     
42
 Cf. ECB, “Implementation aspects of the PSPP”, as updated on 15 April 2015 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp.en.html). 
43
 In case the envisaged amounts cannot be purchased in a jurisdiction, NCBs will conduct substitute purchases 
in bonds issued by international organisations and multilateral development banks located in the euro area.  
44
 D. Gros and C. Kopf (2015), “There is no QE without risk sharing”, Reuters, 20 January. 
THE MONETARY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2002-2015) | 31 
 
The ECB will purchase public securities with maturity between 2 and 30 years, with 
remaining maturity above two years and return higher than -20 basis points (the rate 
currently paid by the ECB in its deposit facility). The securities purchases can never exceed 
one-third of a country’s debt issuance, or 25% of any given issue. The rationale of these 
provisions is both economic and legal. The economic rationale is to minimise the impact on 
market functioning, notably with a view to preserve the price discovery mechanism, and 
avoid impairing market liquidity. A specific issue arising in this context is that of ensuring 
that the ECB purchases do not reduce the effective supply of collateral available to market 
participants; to this end, PSPP securities will be made available through a securities lending 
facility (as already done by other central banks, e.g. the Bank of England). 
The legal rationale is twofold. On one hand, the ECB does not want to have a blocking vote 
on the possible decision by creditors to activate a collective action clause (CAC)45 on one or 
some of the bonds held by the Eurosystem, which could be seen as monetary financing of the 
debtor. Moreover, there is an important case pending before the European Court of Justice, 
following a reference for preliminary ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court on 
the legality of the 2012 OMT programme,46 which may also be relevant for QE purchases. 
While the decision of the Court is yet unknown, the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón, published on 14 January 2015, takes as its starting point that the OMT must be 
considered an unconventional monetary policy measure, not per se extraneous to the ECB 
mandate, but to be subject to special precautions in order not to trespass the separating line 
between monetary policy (the domain of the ECB) and economic policy (the domain of 
governments, where the ECB must not intervene). The specific point in the Opinion relevant 
here is that “the OMT programme will, in the event of its being activated, have to be 
implemented in such a way that a market price can form in respect of the government bonds 
concerned, so that there continues to be a real difference between a purchase of bonds on the 
primary market and a purchase on the secondary market”.47 As may be seen, these legal 
aspects are crucial for the ECB interventions not to be open to the objection of violating the 
prohibition of monetary financing of public deficits as of Article 123 TFEU. They will insure, 
more broadly, against objections coming from German and Nordic quarters whereby the 
ECB market interventions trespass the line between monetary operations and economic 
policies. In this regard, special care has been devoted to respecting the prohibition of 
monetary financing of governments.  
The provisions that have been described entail a sizeable reduction in the public securities 
effectively available for Eurosystem purchases, which has raised fears of a possible scarcity 
of securities. In this regard, one may note that, although an increasing share of Eurozone 
public bond issues carries negative returns, notably in the core and Nordic countries, for the 
time being the minimum return requirement (-20 basis points) is not binding, and therefore 
has no impact on eligible securities. On the other hand, in some cases the expected net 
issuance of public bonds is small relative to expected purchases (Table 2); while the highest 
                                                     
45
 The ESM Treaty mandates the inclusion of CACs in all new euro area government securities with maturity 
above one year as of 1 January 2013. CACs were expected to facilitate the coordination of investors in case of a 
debt default or restructuring. 
46
 Case C-62/14. 
47
 Cf. Court of Justice of the European Union (2015), Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-62/14, Peter 
Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag, Press Release No 2/15 Luxembourg, 14 January 
(http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-01/cp150002en.pdf). 
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quality sovereigns loom large in the portfolios of central banks, sovereign funds and other 
institutional investors which may be reluctant to sell them in view of statutory limitations on 
their portfolio composition (Pradhan, 2015). 
Table 2. Public debt, expected issuance and QE purchases for selected participants to the Eurosystem (bln €) 
 Total public debt 
outstanding as of  
Dec 2014 
Legacy 
holdings  
by the ECB 
2-30 yearly 
issuance 
Expected QE 
purchases 
Mar. 2015-Sep. 2016  
Belgium 428 4.6 33 29.4 
France 2038 42.2 187 168.4 
Germany 2170 4.4 159 213.7 
Greece 317 19.8 0.0 1.2 
Ireland 203 37 14 13.8 
Italy 2135 197.9 260 146.2 
Netherlands 451 0.0 48 47.5 
Spain 1034 65.3 142 105 
Source: Eurostat and Claeys et al. (2015). 
 
Be that as it may, it is yet too early to judge. For the time being, what is important is that 
long-term rates went down significantly in all eurozone markets, together with spreads 
between German rates and rates elsewhere in the eurozone, while stock market prices shot 
up (Figure 15). The euro has weakened significantly against the main currencies (Figure 2), 
creating breathing space for exporters, notably in the low productivity periphery. This 
evolution of bond prices and the exchange rate has been largely driven by expectations: one 
may note, for instance, that the descent of the euro was triggered already in the spring of 
2014 when the 5y-on-5y inflation-linked swap rate slid below 2%, signalling that medium-
term inflation expectations were becoming ‘un-anchored’. The announcement of QE last 
January also led to an immediate bounce-back of inflation expectations on short- and 
medium-term maturities (as may be seen back to Figure 12). 
This highlights once again the delicate balancing acts that the ECB will have to perform in 
managing private agents’ expectations of supporting the recovery of inflation and economic 
activity in a very uncertain environment, in which central banks have indeed become the 
main anchor for private expectations. 
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Figure 15. Stock and bond indexes for eurozone (November 2008=1) 
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Source: Euro STOXX and S&P. 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed the ECB monetary policy since the inception of the euro in 2002. 
Over this time span, the ECB has managed to build the reputation of a strong, competent and 
independent institution. It has emerged as the only institution capable of timely and effective 
action to tackle the financial crisis following the Lehman failure and the sovereign debt crisis, 
and is again today the principal policy player in the quest for reviving growth in the 
eurozone economy. The events unfolding over the past 14 years have also highlighted some 
serious shortcomings of the original institutional design and the policy concepts that had 
guided the establishment of the ECB. Among these, two stand out.  
The first one, less than fully recognised, is that monetary union without consistent fiscal and 
economic policies may create an unstable policy combination, when divergences in prices, 
wages and productivity persist. The reason is that, far from bringing steady market 
discipline to bear on divergent countries, the single currency may accommodate economic 
divergences for quite some time – as it happened in 2002-07 – leading to massive economic 
imbalances that at some stage were bound to explode. When that happens, financial markets 
may overshoot in the opposite direction, to the point of threatening the very solvency of 
some participants in the common currency. All in all, it has emerged that one currency 
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cannot fit all unless the member countries move swiftly to address the underlying causes of 
economic divergence. 
The second shortcoming is that the mandate of the ECB, while not excluding extensive 
powers to intervene as lender of last resort of the banking system, did not include the power 
to stabilise the sovereign debt markets of its member states in case of systemic shocks 
endangering financial stability. When the shocks did come, it became clear beyond all doubt 
that, without such a backstop, the monetary union remains exposed to destabilising capital 
flows and attendant balance of payments crises that, if left unchecked, can break the 
currency. Fortunately, making full use of its powers and tools in order to stabilise unsettled 
financial markets was not forbidden under the TFEU and the ESCB Statute; thus President 
Draghi could manage sufficient consensus within the Governing Council to undertake OMT 
and, later on, also QE. The conditions under which these interventions were undertaken 
have been designed so as to respect the legal limit between monetary policy interventions 
and economic policies, notably in respect of the prohibition of monetary financing of 
governments. This was a hard lesson, learnt amidst acute turmoil; and yet, staunch 
opposition within the Governing Council, and in some member states, has not been 
overcome and may still come back to haunt the ECB – especially with the coming review of 
the legality of OMT by the Court of Karlsruhe.   
Which brings us to a final remark on the impact of the crisis on the ECB institutional place 
and role within the eurozone policy-making. As was mentioned, the ECB has emerged as the 
only policy player capable of acting decisively at times of stress, and has been able to do so 
by stretching the scope of its instruments and operations well beyond what had been 
envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, more often than not the ECB could only come 
to the rescue after the system has been driven close to breakdown (Eichengreen, 2015).  
Resistance by some members of the Governing Council was one reason: they considered it 
improper for the ECB to counter financial instability in sovereign securities markets, as this 
would weaken the pressure to reform on distressed countries. The behaviour of the 
Berlusconi government in September and October 2011 confirmed their worst fears: as soon 
as Eurosystem sovereign purchases brought about immediate and visible relief in market 
strains, Italian structural reforms stalled.  
However, there are drawbacks to using the ECB monetary policy to combat moral hazard. 
For one thing, what the ECB needs to do to combat market instability may run counter to 
what may be required in order to discipline unruly national governments. In a properly 
designed system, the task to combat moral hazard and discipline budgetary and economic 
policies in general should not fall on the shoulders of the central bank. 
Another reason was the strategy game underway between the ECB and the European 
Council. The ECB felt strongly that it was for the Council to set up adequate defences against 
idiosyncratic shocks hitting some members of the eurozone (Bastasin, 2015; Henning, 2015). 
But the Council proved repeatedly unable to deliver, owing to disagreements among its 
members on the appropriate responses to the crisis. We have recalled that in March 2011 the 
ECB did not hesitate to interrupt the SMP to signal its dissatisfaction with the European 
Council resistance to endowing the ESM with adequate powers. In winter 2011-12, the ECB 
was an outspoken advocate of tighter fiscal rules, including the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’. It 
staunchly opposed the European Council policy on debt restructuring. Between the end of 
2010 and summer 2011, the ECB wrote letters to the Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian 
authorities, telling them what to do to restore financial viability, not always fully in line with 
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the Council and the Commission. The latest step has been the use of ELA as a negotiating 
lever to keep the rope tight around the neck of the Greek economy, as the new government 
struggles to find a policy course acceptable to its creditors, on one hand, and its electors, on 
the other.  
In all these circumstances the ECB acted with the motivation of preserving the integrity of 
the eurozone financial system and the euro itself; repeatedly, it was obliged to fill gaps 
created by the European Council’s inability to come to timely agreements on required 
changes in policies and institutions. And yet, one cannot avoid the conclusion that in the 
process the ECB has become a full player in economic policy-making, with consequences yet 
to be reckoned with.  
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